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ABSTRACT 
 
This study replicates a 2002 study that used perceptual mapping to identify the collective and 
individual positions of nine, newly established nations of the former Soviet Union as foreign direct 
investment (FDI) options. With the continued growth of FDI globally, the purpose of the 2010 
study was to determine if significant shifts had occurred in the perceived positions of the 
individual nations, as well as that of the "ideal" nation. FDI executives surveyed indicated that a 
limited number of newly established nations (e.g., Azerbaijan, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the 
Ukraine) are positioned most strategically to benefit from future foreign direct investments. Of the 
newly established nations studied, Azerbaijan appears to hold a strategically unique position. The 
abundance of natural resources, the nation’s improving political and economic environments, and 
favorable business requirements all contribute significantly to this nation’s perceived position. 
Some nations (e.g., Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova) continue to face significant FDI 
obstacles. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
oreign Direct Investment (FDI) continues to be an integral component of the globalization of the 
world‟s economy, as well as a key aspect of every nation‟s economic development efforts. Virtually 
all nations are eager to attract FDI, as evidenced by the immense financial investments in newly 
developed (NDCs) or developing (LDCs) countries in recent years (Aitken et al., 1997; Jenkins, 1995; Kim, 2010; 
Krifa-Schneider and Matei, 2010). As is well established in economic development literature, success in attracting 
foreign capital is a function of a nation‟s resource attractiveness and the presence and availability of investment 
opportunities that permit or facilitate foreign direct investment (Kok and Ersoy, 2009).   
 
Facilitating the rise in such investments have been the metamorphoses that have occurred in the social, 
economic, and political environments governing foreign direct investment in previously closed nations such as those 
of the former Soviet Union (FSU) (Agarwal, 1997; Blasi et al., 1997; Kamm, 1992; Wan 2010). These nations and 
socio-political environments have changed (or are in the process of changing) from essentially closed economies 
advocating protectionism, subsidies, and increased regulations to more market and growth-oriented positions 
espousing regulatory reform, market expansion, and private sector development. In turn, these changes have 
encouraged foreign investors to revise their view of nations considered foreign direct investment candidates. While 
still largely comprised of developed nations, many FDI lists now include nations (e.g., FSU nations) considered as 
newly developed or emerging.  
 
Consisting of the Baltic States, as well as those now considered as South-East Europe, all of these newly 
established FSU nations have experienced privatization programs and related political and economic reforms 
designed to promote economic freedom and prosperity (Capik, 2007; Grosse and Trevino, 2005; Kornecki and 
F 
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Rhoades, 2007). Despite these reforms and major capital investments, extant evidence indicates that there has been 
limited improvement in the general economic performance of these nations (Bitzenis, 2004; Busse and Hefeker, 
2007; Beugelsdijk, et al., 2008; Estrin and Wright, 1999; Fifka, 2008). Factors contributing to the paucity of 
economic growth include a decline in product demand, substantial variations in industrial output, as well as the 
deterioration of requisite support networks previously linked to the coordinated supply system of central planning 
(Anderson, 2008; Hudson, 2008).  
 
FSU nations have received major infusions of investment capital from virtually all developed nations over 
the past decade (Gaddy and Ickes, 1998; Kim, 2010; Terpstra and Sarathy, 2000; Wan, 2010). While US FDI in 
these nations was limited during the 1980‟s (vis-à-vis other developing or developed countries), that changed 
dramatically beginning in the 1990‟s and continuing into the next decade (Bitzenis, 2004; Kornecki and Rhoades, 
2007; PR Newswire, 2008).  
 
However, until the integration of a free market economy, multiple factors will continue to limit the fiscal 
participation of US firms in FSU nations. Arguably the most significant limiting factor is the level of risk associated 
with a developing nation (Dichtl and Koglmayr, 1986; Grosse and Trevino 2005; Kim, 2010; Krifa-Schneider and 
Matei, 2010). Varying in form and magnitude, the risk associated with FSU nations often is intangible and largely 
based upon perception (Capik, 2007). Given the previous comments and the limited amount of empirical 
information that exists concerning the relative and/or perceived market position of various nations of the FSU, this 
research was conducted.  
 
The purpose of the research was to identify the market position of nine newly established nations of the 
FSU as perceived by American business executives who participate in their company‟s foreign direct investment 
decisions. Specific objectives of the study included: 
 
1. Empirically establish the perceived market position of nine newly established nations of the FSU 
2. Develop perceived profiles of each individual newly established nation 
3. Develop an aggregate profile of the ideal nation vis-à-vis the nine newly established nations studied 
  
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
Foreign direct investment can be viewed from dual, dichotomous perspectives (i.e., investing 
companies/recipient countries and inward/outward investment). Relative to the former, foreign direct investment is 
an investment made to acquire an on-going interest (normally 10% of voting stock) in a business enterprise 
operating in a country other than that of the investor. Ownership of less than 10% is regarded as portfolio investment 
(Chowdhury and Mavrotas, 2006; World Bank, 1996).  
 
Concerning inward/outward investment, FDI can be divided into “Greenfield” investments, also called 
“mortar and brick” investments, as well as mergers and acquisitions, which entail the acquisition of an existing 
interest rather than new investment. As such, countries can host FDI projects in their own country, as well as 
participate in FDI projects in other countries. A country‟s inward FDI position is made up of the hosted FDI 
projects, while outward FDI represents those investment projects owned abroad (Wan, 2010). Figure 1 presents an 
overview of FDI and the effects of such on both investor and recipient nations (Peng, 2011). 
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Figure 1: Effects of FDI 
 
 
Extant literature suggests that multinational enterprises invest in foreign countries for a variety of reasons. 
For example, several studies have determined that investors seek to take advantage of location strengths, create a 
competitive advantage, or sustain the competitive advantage that they were able to create in their domestic markets 
(Cho and Moon, 1998; Clark, 1996; Earle and Estrin, 1996; Ensign, 1993; Estrin and Meyer, 1998; Hill and Jones, 
2000; Hitt, 1996; Krifa-Schneider and Matei, 2010; Kahai and Simmons, 2005; Vance, et al., 1993). The literature 
also suggests that certain negative outcomes (i.e., see cells 2 & 4) are associated with FDI (Meyer, 2004). While the 
benefits of FDI generally are regarded as outweighing the shortcomings, all nations must consider both perspectives 
prior to the FDI decision. 
 
NEWLY ESTABLISHED NATIONS OF THE FSU 
 
For decades, FDI was perceived as a threat to communism and national sovereignty. As a result, 
government policy and legislation were devised to severely restrict foreign investments, particularly from the United 
States. To some extent, this legacy remains intact. Hungary, for example, generally considered the most advanced 
post-communist country, with a successful economy and a fully functioning democracy, required almost twenty 
years to achieve the level needed to sustain a properly functioning market economy (Jones, 2000; Taylor, 2000).  
 
Like Hungary, nations of the FSU suffer from decades of controlled economies. For example, despite 
purported long-term market controlled goals, in the short-term, the political leadership of Belarus remains quite 
hostile toward private business. Foreign direct investment in Belarus has been extremely slow and limited as a result 
of the lethargy of these privatization efforts (Filatotchev et al., 1999a and 1999b). 
 
Another challenge has been the (in)stability of the institutional infrastructure in emerging countries that 
have put democratic institutions in place (Michalopoulos and Drebentsov, 1997; Michalopoulos and Tarr, 1997). For 
example, conflict in the Balkans, social unrest in Pakistan, tensions between Greece and Turkey, political 
assassinations and resignations of democratically elected governments are constant reminders of the fragility of new 
democracies (Buck, et al., 1999; Earle and Estrin, 1996).  
 
To implement market economies, emerging countries may impose hardships on a population accustomed to 
the welfare state. In turn, this reliance leads to a rise in the popularity of communist and socialist political parties 
that threaten new democratic and market-oriented institutions. The prospect that these nations can at any time fall 
back into political and economic instability can negatively affect the perceptions that foreign investors have about 
these countries (Filatotchev, et al., 1999c). 
 
However, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
marked a turning point in the role that multinational enterprises and national governments play in facilitating the 
creation of a sustainable and balanced economy. In several of the newly established nations of the FSU, the 1990‟s 
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brought new government legislation that codified changes in public policies toward free enterprise and foreign 
investments (Beudegesdik, et al., 2008; Brock, 2005; Jones, 2000; Kornecki and Rhoades, 2007; McCrary, 2000).  
 
For example, several East European governments, particularly Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Bulgaria, were some of the first such nations to enact competition laws and bilateral investment treaties aimed at 
encouraging foreign investments. The success of these countries (and others) in their efforts to develop market-
oriented economies contributed mightily to their inclusion into the EU (Orton, 2000). More recently, the Baltic 
States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (now members of the EU) also have proven to be desirable FDI destinations 
(Bitzenis, 2004; Demekas, et al., 2007; Fifka, 2008).  
 
Despite the progress that has been made in political and economic reform, a number of challenges continue 
to limit the flow of foreign investments into emerging nations. As Dunning (1993) suggested, the most important of 
these challenges are the political systems, values, and ideologies that most emerging nations inherited from their 
ancestral centralized economies. Many of these obstacles to the continued development of market-oriented 
economies, thus a nation‟s ability to attract foreign capital, remain intact (Buck, et al., 1999; Grosse and Trevino, 
2005; Ramcharran, 2000).  
 
US firms historically have chosen to invest in Europe and Japan (Terpstra and Sarathy, 2000; United 
Nations, 1992). This practice changed somewhat during the 1990‟s as US emphasis shifted to developing nations, 
most notably China and Brazil. While investment in these countries could be justified by the scope of the market 
opportunity alone, generally absent from this new investment mix were the emerging nations of the FSU (Wright, et 
al., 2000). While various reasons may be posited as to why US firms have taken a more cautious approach to foreign 
direct investment in the emerging nations of the FSU, national risk perceptions remain a viable explanation 
(Arcelus, Ivanova, and Srinivasan, 1996; Dutta and Roy, 2011; Kok and Ersoy, 2009; Linz, 1997).  
 
For example, in a global study of risk, Romania, a prominent and representative member of the newly 
emerging nations of the FSU received an overall risk composite score of 50 (1-90, where lower scores represent 
higher risk). In contrast, China received a score of 69, while Switzerland received the highest overall composite risk 
score (94) (Erb, Campbell, and Viskanta, 1996). A decade later after the enactment of numerous reforms designed to 
Romania‟s FDI climate, Romania‟s score was 57 compared to China‟s 76 and Switzerland‟s 97 (Nordal, 2010); 
Euromoney, 2006).  
 
Three different types of risk often are associated with a nation as a firm considers making a direct 
investment in that country. These risk types include the political and economic environment, domestic conditions, 
and economic relations (Dichtl and Koglmayr, 1986). Christiansen and Ogutcu (2002) noted that investors are 
influenced by the profitability or financial risk of a project, the easy with which operations can be integrated into 
global strategies, and the overall quality of the host‟s country‟s enabling business environment. Regardless of 
risk/opportunity form, executives charged with the responsibility for making the FDI decision must achieve “a more 
thorough understanding of the likelihood of various problems and opportunities in a country” (Kotabe and Helson, 
1998). This understanding, while informed, is based upon the perception(s) of that nation, region, or market. These 
perceptions form what is commonly known as “market position or location.”  
 
In marketing terminology, the product‟s “location” is its position in the mind of a consumer. In this 
instance, the consumer is the foreign direct investor who is concerned with how a product (i.e., a given nation and its 
“bundle of attributes”) is perceived. More specifically, for foreign direct investment purposes, position refers to the 
investor‟s perception of a nation vis-à-vis a competing nation as an investment option.  
 
POSITIONING: CONCEPT AND APPLICATION 
 
The positioning concept received its first application over thirty years ago. Since that time, it has enjoyed 
myriad applications ranging from consumer products, to political campaigns, to job placement. According to Ries 
and Trout (1981), positioning should not be confused with strategy, even though the two are inextricably related. 
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Positioning is defined formally as the act of defining the product‟s image and value offer so that the 
segment‟s customers understand and appreciate what the product stands for in relation to its competitors (Green, 
1975; Scanlon, 1994). Stated in more pragmatic terms, for a product, business, or investment option to establish an 
appropriate, desirable position in the marketplace, it must demonstrate to its potential stakeholders how it differs 
from competing options. In so doing, the host entity (i.e., each emerging nation) is attempting to establish a 
competitive advantage. Gilmore (2002), Young (2004), and Capik (2007), in a discussion of national promotion, 
specifically proposed the use of multiple promotional tools to more advantageously communicate the strengths of a 
particular nation and/or area within that nation. 
 
Using the framework of research conducted almost a decade ago, the purpose of this research was to re-
establishing the position of nine nations of the FSU as FDI options. Any shifts in the perceived position of these 
nations may speak to the effectiveness of infrastructure changes, political redirection, or promotional activities 
undertaken to secure inward investments. Likewise, information gleaned from this longitudinal study may offer 
some insight as to how and why US foreign direct investors have made their investment decisions with regard to 
these nations, as well as contribute to future FDI investment decisions and research.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The data for the original research were obtained via a mail survey of a randomly selected sample of 500 
executives chosen from the membership of the Industrial Development Research Council (IDRC 2000/2001). Data 
for the 2010 version of the study utilized the membership of CoreNet Global. Like the IRDC (which no longer 
functions), CoreNet Global members include representatives from manufacturing, banking, public and private 
development organizations, utilities, communication, and government agencies, only representatives of domestic, 
for-profit organizations were included in this study. CoreNet Global did not sponsor or endorse this project. 
 
A self-administered questionnaire, the same as in the original study, was used except this version was 
administered electronically. The questionnaire obtained measures that identified the respondents‟ familiarity with 
each of nine newly established nations of the former Soviet Union (FSU), the perceived position of each nation, as 
well as specific nation-related attributes. 
 
Each respondent was asked to indicate how familiar (s)he was with each of the nine newly established 
nations of the former Soviet Union studied. Familiarity was measured using bipolar adjectives, either familiar or 
unfamiliar. Familiarity with a nation indicated that a respondent possessed some knowledge of a nation as a foreign 
direct investment option. Unfamiliarity with a nation indicated that a respondent possessed little knowledge of a 
nation as a foreign direct investment option. The operational definitions of familiarity/unfamiliarity were provided in 
the instructions preceding measurement.  
 
A common method for quantifying the position of an entity (i.e., a nation) vis-à-vis competing entities (i.e., 
nations), is through the technique of Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) (Green, 1975). This procedure converts 
ratings of perceived similarities to a geometric representation of several positions relative to one another. In turn, the 
perceptual map created is based upon multiple dimensions, representing the salient "top-of-mind" attributes the 
respondents associated with the nine newly established nations studied. By measuring the preference concerning 
available options, the "ideal" option also can be portrayed on a perceptual map created from perceived similarities. 
To allow development of the perceptual map, respondents again were asked to rate each of the nine newly 
established nations with respect to similarity on a five-point Likert scale (1 = Very Dissimilar to 5 = Very Similar). 
Respondents then indicated which nation they preferred.  
 
A total of 72 usable responses were received, for an overall response rate of 12%. To detect any potential 
nonresponse bias, a telephone survey was conducted with 15 randomly selected nonrespondents. Nonrespondents 
were asked to indicate the extent of their familiarity with each of the nine nations being studied. The responses of 
both groups (i.e., respondents and non-respondents) were reviewed by two external judges and a priorily deemed 
comparable. As Table 1 indicates, respondents include a variety of professionals from organizations located in all 
areas of the country. Compared to the 2002 study, respondents from the eastern portion of the US are over 
represented, thus represent a potential source of regional bias. 
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Table 1:  Description Of Respondents 
Region  
 East 76% 
 Central 12% 
 South 8% 
 West 4% 
FDI Experience  
 Less than 3 years 5% 
 3-9 years 35% 
 Over 9 years 60% 
Type of Organization  
 Manufacturing 66% 
 Non-manufacturing 34% 
Position in Organization  
 Vice President/President 63% 
 Director/Manager 37% 
 
 
FAMILIARITY WITH SELECT NATIONS OF THE FSU 
 
Compared to the 2002 study, the respondents‟ overall familiarity with the nine nations studied was 
significantly greater than in the original study. These results are not surprising given the Baltic States addition to the 
EU in 2004, the discovery and development of energy in Azerbaijan, the continued globalization of business, and 
specific economic development activities of each nation aimed at attracting FDI (Fifka, 2008; Jun and Singh, 1996; 
Kinda, 2010). 
 
This increased familiarity again provided the perceptual basis for subsequent responses. As indicated in 
Table 2, respondents were most familiar with Azerbaijan and the EU nations of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, as well as 
the Ukraine. Conversely, respondents were least familiar with the southern and eastern most nations of Armenia, 
Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova.  
 
 
Table 2:  Familiarity With Select Nations Of The Fsu 
Nation 2010 % Familiarity (02%) 2010 % Unfamiliarity (02) 
Armenia 57 ( 8) 43 (92) 
Azerbaijan 83 (13) 17 (87) 
Belarus 53 (23) 47 (77) 
Estonia 68 (18) 32 (82) 
Georgia 53 ( 7) 47 (93) 
Latvia 67 (17) 33 (83) 
Lithuania 64 (24) 36 (76) 
Moldova 58 ( 8) 42 (92) 
Ukraine 77 (17) 23 (83) 
 
 
PERCEPTUAL MAPPING OF SELECT NATIONS OF THE FSU 
 
Like its 2002 predecessor (see Figure 2), the 2010 perceptual map of FSU nations that was developed 
exhibited three dimensions (see Figure 3). These dimensions, which are the same in both studies, are portrayed in 
Figures 2 and 3 as Political and Economic Stability, Natural Resources, and Business Requirements. The perceived 
positions of all nations studied, as well as that of the ideal nation, are identified as relative points located along and 
above (denoted by a solid line) or below (denoted by a dotted line) the three axes (line length denotes the extent 
above or below the midpoint of each axis).   
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When comparing the overall results of the two studies (i.e., 2002 and 2010), it is readily apparent that a 
significant shift has taken place. In the current study, virtually all of the nations studied are perceived as having 
improved their perceived position as a FDI destination. The five nations found to be the most disadvantageously 
positioned in 2002 (i.e., Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova), now appear to be perceived as 
viable FDI candidates when compared to their former positions, as well as other four nations, a conclusion supported 
by east European FDI projections for the 2005-2010 period (Country Monitor, 2006; Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, 
2007; Russia and CIS Banking and Finance Weekly, 2009). 
 
The current findings indicate that a group of nations consisting of the Baltic States (i.e., Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania), the Ukraine, and Azerbaijan are perceived as occupying the most strategically desirable positions. 
Of these nations, only the Ukraine‟s position appears to have deteriorated since 2002, which is surprising since FDI 
in the Ukraine was up approximately 6% in 2010 (Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, 2009; Statistics Weekly, 2010). 
Other nations (i.e., Armenia and Belarus) appear to be clustered together, as are Georgia and Moldova, but all are 
perceived as being somewhat less desirable FDI locations (vis-à-vis the preceding nations). Of these latter nations, 
Moldova, despite its proximity to the Ukraine and the more economically developed nation of Romania, appears to 
be something of a FDI outlier in that it is not perceived as being as desirable an FDI location as the other nations.   
 
As might be expected with EU membership, the Baltic States, especially Estonia, occupy desirable FDI 
positions (Oxford Daily Brief, 2005). Estonia, widely known as the “Baltic Tiger,” is a FDI favorite, as many foreign 
companies chose Estonia as their initial Baltic FDI destination and then expand operations to neighboring countries 
(Bitzenis, 2004; Oxford Daily Brief, 2002). In contrast, both Latvia and Lithuania offer somewhat less attractive FDI 
opportunities because of continuing political corruption and the absence of a developed banking system similar to 
that of Estonia (EIU Newswire, 2010; Fifka, 2008).   
 
As noted earlier, Moldova continues to occupy the most dubious overall position with few apparent FDI 
strengths. Consistent with the image generally presented in the media, three nations (i.e., Armenia, Belarus, and 
Georgia) are perceived as “high risk” because of political and economic instability and do not expect to see FDI 
increases (Statistics Weekly, 2010). Perhaps the most curious position is that occupied by Belarus. This nation is 
viewed as having modest natural resources, but a less than accommodating business environment and a somewhat 
unstable political and economic environment. Given that nation‟s geographic position (i.e., proximity to the Ukraine, 
Poland, and the Baltic nations), Belarus should be a desirable candidate for foreign direct investment. However, 
major shortcomings in two of the three criterion areas have limited those investments.    
 
Azerbaijan, primarily because of its energy reserves, as well as proximity to the Caspian Sea and Middle 
Eastern oil-producing nations, is perceived as having (or having access to) substantial natural resources. While the 
stability of Azerbaijan‟s political and economic environment has improved markedly (Ismayilova, 2011; Russia and 
CIS Business and Financial Newswire, 2010), concerns of Russian interference and questionable political leadership 
still exist. In contrast, Azerbaijan‟s privatization efforts, investment in infrastructure, developing of financial and 
banking systems, and pro-business regulations have improved the prospects of FDI greatly (Pomfret, 2011).  
Respondents perceive the ideal FSU nation as possessing qualities that may be viewed as unattainable. Executives 
view all qualities and factors as being important, but recognize that FSU nations will require additional time and 
effort before these nations can come close to such ideal standards. This research did not ascertain the relative 
importance of each investment criteria.  
 
While none of the newly established nations studied occupy a position close to the ideal, Estonia comes 
closest. In the 2002 study, this position was occupied by the Ukraine. As the current study suggests, if Azerbaijan 
can sustain a stable political and economic environment, it too has the opportunity to move in the direction of the 
ideal nation. Perhaps it is most important to again recognize that all of the nations studied have advanced their 
positions in the direction of the ideal nation. Such a collective movement suggests that all of the nations studied 
recognize the FDI opportunity that exists and the requirements associated with such. Continued efforts to further 
improve these positions may well further enhance the perceived position of each nation vis-a-vis competing nations 
and in minds of FDI officials.  
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A – Armenia   D – Estonia   G – Lithuania 
B – Azerbaijan   E – Georgia   H – Moldova 
C – Belarus   F – Latvia   I – Ukraine 
 
Figure 2: 2002 Perceptual Map of Select Nations of the FSU 
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A – Armenia   D – Estonia   G – Lithuania 
B – Azerbaijan   E – Georgia   H – Moldova 
C – Belarus   F – Latvia    I - Ukraine 
 
Figure 3:  2010 Perceptual Map of Select Nations of the FSU 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Foreign direct investments generally are recognized as providing an opportunity for nations, governments, 
society, and businesses to improve economically. As such, most nations around the globe are pursuing (to some 
extent) direct investments by foreign governments, companies, and private investors. The pursuit of these foreign 
direct investments is particularly competitive among emerging and/or newly established nations, such as those of the 
former Soviet Union. To be successful, a nation must position itself as being more desirable than other nations, 
especially other FSU nations. This study was undertaken to determine if and how investment executives‟ 
perceptions of nine competing nations of the FSU had changed over the past decade.  
 
Overall, these findings demonstrate and identify where and how nine of the newly established nations of 
the FSU are perceived individually and collectively. The current findings also demonstrate that the perceived 
position of all FSU nations studied has improved significantly over the past decade. Based upon these findings, the 
Baltic States, Estonia in particular, the Ukraine, and Azerbaijan are perceived as occupying the most strategically 
advantageous positions. In contrast, Armenia, Belarus, and Moldova have an opportunity to improve their prospects 
for FDI via improvements in perceived positional changes. 
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The foreign direct investment challenge and opportunity for each nation lies in its desire and ability to 
affect meaningful and enduring change. If this commitment can be achieved, then each nation must develop an 
economic development program designed to capitalize on and/or ameliorate each aspect of their perceived position. 
Unfortunately, changes such as that required have proven problematic. 
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